I. INTRODUCTION
What can we say, in good faith, about the moral status of animals? Understood through the prsm of Emmanuel Levnas' theory of ethcs, the queston requres us to pay close attenton to the nature of our encounter wth the non-human Other. There has been sgnficant debate as to whether Levnas' theory can accommodate the ethcal nterests of non-humans. 1 In ths artcle, I argue that Levnas' work can be read as supportng not only a vew of anmals as ethcal bengs, but a theory of anmal rghts.
Non-human anmals occupy a problematc poston n Levnas' wrtngs. Levnas' explct comments on the ethcal status of anmals are ambguous, as we wll see n more detal below. Although some theorsts are more optmstc than others about the potental of Levnas' theory to support the ethcal personalty of anmals, many commentators have depcted hs account as fundamentally human-orented. My am n ths artcle s to cast doubt on ths nterpretaton. I argue that Levnas' theory s best read as suggestng that non-human anmals present clams for recognton as ethcal bengs, but that these demands have a dfferent character to those presented by humans.
What do we have to gan by pursung a Levnasan account of the ethcal status of non-human anmals? After all, those seekng a phlosophcal bass for the vew that anmals are enttled to moral consderaton have a range of theores to choose from, ncludng the well-known accounts offered by Peter Snger and Tom Regan.
2 However, there are at least two good reasons for persstng wth a Levnasan perspectve on ths area.
The first reason has to do wth what Levnas' comments on non-human anmals tell us about hs broader ethcal theory. An examnaton of the ambguous poston of non-humans n Levnas' wrtngs holds the potental to cast lght on hs mportant notons of alterty, proxmty and the face, as well as llumnatng the role of sufferng n hs account. We mght therefore use ths enqury to deepen our understandng not only of the ethcal status of anmals, but also of ethcal relatons between humans.
A Levnasan account of the ethcal status of non-human anmals also offers us a novel framework for explorng the role of rghts n moral and poltcal dscourse. Levnas offers us an account of moral reasonng that s fundamentally Other-orented. Ths provdes an mportant counterpont to tradtonal lberal accounts of rghts, whch are strongly focused on the noton of the Self. 3 A Levnasan theory of anmal rghts, n partcular, holds the potental to unsettle ths tradtonal outlook. Indeed, from a Levnasan perspectve, anmal rghts mght properly be vewed as a model for the noton of human rghts, snce they capture the essental asymmetry of the ethcal encounter.
II. LEVINAS ON NON-hUMAN ANIMALS
It wll be useful to begn by examnng Levnas' few explct comments on the ethcal status of non-human anmals. The startng pont for many dscussons of Levnas' vews on ths topc s the essay "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rghts" n Difficult Freedom, 4 n whch Levnas reflects on hs experences as a Jewsh nternee n a German prsoner of war camp. The affecton and enthusasm of the dog, ncknamed Bobby, who befrends the nternees, serves as a counter-pont to the falure of the camp guards to acknowledge the humanty of ther nmates. However, despte Bobby's ablty to "attest to the dgnty of the person," t s far from clear that Levnas regards Bobby hmself as an ethcal beng. On the contrary, Levnas notes that Bobby has "nether ethcs nor logos;" he lacks "the bran needed to unversalse maxms and drves." 5 Levnas' comments on the status of anmals n ths essay reman somewhat ambguous. He confronts the topc more drectly n an ntervew wth three graduate students publshed as "The Paradox of Moralty." 6 Levnas s asked explctly n the ntervew whether anmals demand recognton as ethcal bengs n a smlar way to humans. Hs response does not completely reject the noton that anmals make ethcal demands upon us, but he makes t clear that these demands are not on the same level as those presented by other humans. "One cannot completely refuse the face of the anmal. … Yet the prorty here s not found n the anmal, but n the human face." 7 Later n the same ntervew, Levnas equvocates further about whether nonhumans can be descrbed as clamng ethcal status. "The human face s completely dfferent and only afterwards do we dscover the face of an anmal. I don't know f a snake has a face. I can't answer that queston."
8 He then goes on to reaffirm hs prevous suggeston that, whle non-human anmals are enttled to Insofar as we can make sense of Levnas' poston n these passages, hs vew would seem to be somethng lke the followng. Non-human anmals may or may not have "faces" n the specfic ethcal sense examned n hs wrtngs, but they certanly do not present the same type of ethcal demands as humans. We have an ethcal duty to spare non-humans from needless sufferng; however, ths duty s not on the same level as the ethcal concern we owe to other humans. How ths sketchy account of the ethcal status of non-human anmals fits n wth the rest of Levnas' theory s not mmedately clear. My am n the followng sectons s to outlne a readng of Levnas' ethcal vews that enables us to better understand how non-humans figure n hs account.
III. LANgUAgE AND ThE FACE
Levnas locates the revelaton of the Other n what he terms the face-to-face encounter. The noton of the face plays a central role n Levnas' first book on ethcs, Totality and Infinity, 10 and contnues to occupy a promnent place n hs second major work, Otherwise than Being. 11 The face of the Other represents a knd of "epphany," n whch "the sensble, stll graspable, turns nto total resstance to the grasp." 12 In the "total nudty of [the Other's] defenceless eyes," the subject encounters a "prmordal" demand for recognton. 13 Levnas speaks at length n Otherwise than Being about the tactle qualtes of the face. The face s "weghted down wth a skn;" 14 t breathes; 15 t exhbts sgns of youth and age; t s a face "wth wrnkles." 16 At the same tme, however, Levnas makes t clear that the face, as he conceves t, s nether a bologcal nor a phenomenologcal noton. 17 The face s ethcs, pure and smple. The face-to-face encounter represents the moment that one becomes prmordally aware of the ethcal responsblty one bears towards the Other. In a way, all Levnas' ethcal wrtngs are an attempt to represent, however fleetngly and mperfectly, the neffable sgnficance of the face.
In both Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, Levnas draws a close connecton between the face and language. 18 The performatve aspect of lan- It follows that language s not merely "a system of sgns."
21 My use of language to address the Other requres me to confront and acknowledge her status as an rreducble ethcal beng.
Levnas' dscusson of the tactle qualtes of the face makes t clear that language s merely one dmenson of the face-to-face encounter. He emphasses elsewhere that the word "face," as used n hs wrtngs, "must not be understood n a narrow way." The face s not "the colour of the eyes, the ruddness of the cheeks" and so on. 22 In a smlar way, the face s not language, even n the performatve sense reflected n the noton of the sayng. On the other hand, t s far from clear whether any consstent separaton could be mantaned, n Levnasan terms, between the two notons.
The mult-layered character of the face-to-face encounter helps to shed some lght on Levnas' equvocaton about whether non-human anmals have faces. Non-human anmals cannot appeal to us through language n the same way as other humans. They do, however, have skn, eyes and other expressve features. They gaze at us and, n that gaze, we recognse the outward trace of another lvng beng. No wonder Levnas hestates. "I don't know f a snake has a face. I can't answer that queston."
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IV. FROM ALTERITY TO pROxIMITY
It s useful at ths pont to examne two further notons that occupy key postons n Levnas' ethcal theory: alterity and proximity. The former dea plays a central role n Totality and Infinity, whle the latter holds a promnent place n Otherwise than Being. One mght partally trace the development of Levnas' ethcal theory n these two works n terms of a movement from alterty to proxmty. Ths dea of an ethcs n movement helps us to further explore Levnas' comments about non-human anmals.
Levnas suggests n Totality and Infinity that the rreducble strangeness of the Other presents an unavodable ethcal demand, whch radcally ressts definton. He argues that our sense of ourselves as ndvduals s necessarly bound up wth our recognton of the ethcal status of the Other. We ntally become aware of our ndvdualty by dstngushng ourselves from objects n our envronment, whch we approprate and represent as ads to our enjoyment. Our awareness of objects leads to language, as objects are communcated and thematsed. It also leads to an awareness of the Other.
We ntally attempt to thematse other people n the same way as objects. The Other demands recognton because she ressts thematsaton; the other person, qua ndvdual, cannot be reduced to a functon of our own enjoyment. Our attempts to thematse the Other conflct wth her fundamental "strangeness," her "very freedom." 25 Smon Crtchley usefully connects Levnas' observatons about the alterty of the Other wth the epstemologcal problem of other mnds. 26 Suppose I hear someone cryng out n pan and rush to her ad. When I get there, the person denes that she was n pan at all. How can I know whether the remark s sncere? Ultmately, I cannot: the other person's state of mnd radcally ressts my knowledge. For Levnas, ths radcal resstance to understandng defines my encounter wth the Other.
Levnas' focus on alterty n Totality and Infinity leads hm to emphasse the asymmetrcal nature of the ethcal encounter. The subject apprehends the Other as both unpredctable and unrelable. Ths requres her to uncondtonally assume responsblty for ther nteracton. The result s a relatonshp where the subject must conceve herself as holdng the upper hand, whereas the Other s permanently stuated as vulnerable. The encounter s defined by the subject's power over the Other: "the face speaks to me and thereby nvtes me nto a relaton commensurate wth a power exercsed." 27 Levnas' depcton of the ethcal encounter n Otherwise than Being contnues to emphasse ts asymmetrcal character. However, the focus shfts from the radcal dstance between the subject and the Other, to the subject's prmordal need to approach her nterlocutor, expressed through the noton of proxmty. Levnas makes t clear that proxmty s not a spatal relaton. Rather, t descrbes that "restlessness" of the subject that compels her to seek greater ntmacy wth and understandng of the Other. 28 Proxmty, for Levnas, s a movement wthout an end: no matter how much the subject strves to approach and embrace the Other, she s destned to find that ther relatonshp s "never close enough."
29 Ths strvng to know and embrace the Other, lke the relatonshp of alterty descrbed above, s fundamentally non-recprocal. It s a relatonshp where the subject finds herself obsessed wth the beng of the Other, wthout beng able to assume or conceve of any recprocal concern.
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V. ThE NON-hUMAN OThER
Non-human anmals occupy a profoundly ambguous poston n the Lev- nasan movement from alterty to proxmty outlned n the prevous secton. We can begn our dscusson of ths pont by explorng the alterty of the nonhuman Other. Do non-human anmals resst thematsaton n such a way as to demand ethcal recognton? Do they draw the subject nto an asymmetrcal relatonshp where the responsbltes of the partes are "commensurate wth a power exercsed"? 31 It s useful to approach ths queston by way of an example. Suppose I hear a cat mewng persstently. I conclude the cat s n pan; my natural nclnaton s to examne the cat and ts surroundngs, n order to determne the cause of ts sufferng. Suppose, however, that I find nothng unusual. Can I know what the cat s experencng?
There s a sense n whch the outlook of the cat s even more alen to me than the perspectve of another human beng. As Thomas Nagel observes n a celebrated essay, any attempt I mght make to magne what t s lke to be a cat or a bat or any other non-human anmal quckly runs up aganst the lmts of my own experences:
Our own experence provdes the basc materal for our magnaton, whose range s therefore lmted. It wll not help to try to magne that one has webbng on one's arms ... To the extent that I could look and behave lke a wasp or a bat wthout changng my fundamental structure, my experences would not be anythng lke the experences of those anmals.
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There s, therefore, a sense n whch non-human anmals are prone to unsettle me and slp beyond my grasp. I am compelled to recognse them as strangers, nsofar as ther phenomenal experences elude thematsaton.
In another respect, however, the beng of the non-human anmal s more transparent to me than the beng of another human. I recognse that a cat has experences, needs and desres. The exact character of the experences and needs may elude my understandng, but I nevertheless feel they are somewhat wthn my grasp. I provde my cat wth food, water and a warm, enclosed place to sleep. Smlarly, the cry of a human nfant can often be understood straghtforwardly as a desre for mlk, sleep or touch.
A mature human, by contrast, has experences, needs and desres, but also commtments, ntentons, plans, nterests, projects, collaboratons and concerns. Whereas the needs of a cat appear relatvely predctable, the plans and commtments of a human beng are experenced as radcally contngent, nsofar as they depend upon ndvdual atttudes and choces. The beng of the cat s undoubtedly somewhat elusve and alen, but the essental character of the other human s radcally naccessble to me.
We mght explore the encounter wth the non-human Other further by reference to the noton of proxmty, contnung along the ethcal trajectory mapped 31 Levnas, Totality and Infinity, supra note 10 at 198. 32 "What s t Lke to Be a Bat?" (1974) 83 Phlosophcal Revew 435 at 439. out above. Does the subject's encounter wth the non-human Other exhbt the type of restlessness or obsesson that Levnas descrbes n Otherwise than Being? Does t reflect a strvng for ntmacy where the closeness of the encounter s "never close enough"? 33 The queston s complex, but the answer seems to be "no."
The non-human Other does not nvte the type of complex and nsatable fascnaton that Levnas observes n nterpersonal encounters. As we saw above, the beng of the non-human Other eludes us, but t does so n a less complex and radcal way than the beng of the other human. We do not know what t s lke to be a cat, but we nonetheless feel we have some measure of the cat's needs and desres. The gaze of the cat does not exert the deep and ntractable fascnaton that we find n the other human.
It s temptng to conclude from ths lne of thought that non-humans are not ethcal subjects wthn the meanng of Levnas' account. 34 However, ths would be too hasty. There s a good reason why Levnas hmself does not gve such an unequvocal answer. The non-human Other gazes at us and, n that gaze, we find somethng less challengng and all-consumng than the ethcal demand presented by other humans. Nonetheless, we cannot smply dsmss t wthout another thought.
The gaze of the non-human Other may not obsess us, but t nonetheless contans an nescapable demand for recognton as a lvng beng. It draws us nto an unequal relaton where we possess the upper hand. It casts our freedom nto queston; t challenges and problematses our poston of power. As Levnas observes, "one cannot completely refuse the face of the anmal." 35 The ethcal envronment we nhabt does not reduce to a smple dchotomy of subject and object; t confronts us nstead wth the dstnctve demands presented by dfferent types of bengs.
VI. ThE EThICS OF SUFFERINg
The noton of sufferng plays an mportant role n Levnas' account of ethcs. We must accept responsblty for the sufferng of the Other. As Levnas observes n hs semnal essay on "Useless Sufferng" n Entre Nous, sufferng s not a mere "datum," but rather somethng more prmordal, akn to a "revulson."
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It reveals, mmedately and powerfully, the vulnerablty of the Other. "Sufferng s a pure undergong:" t does not merely frustrate or lmt the freedom of the Other, but renders the vctm entrely passve, stuatng her as nothng more than a "mere thng."
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Ths understandng of the sgnficance of sufferng holds mportant mplcatons for the ethcal status of the non-human Other. Agan, t s no accdent that Levnas' comments on non-humans focus heavly on ther capacty for sufferng. 38 We saw above that the non-human Other s not a mere thng; the gaze of a non-human s nescapably that of a lvng beng. It follows that sufferng, whch stuates the vctm as a mere object, s an evl for non-humans. As Levnas observes, t s not purely or even prmarly a matter of restrctng the vctm's freedom. It s the brutal reductonsm of sufferng, whch stuates a lvng presence as f t were a mere thng, that horrfies and revolts us. The non-human vctm of sufferng, no less than the human, calls out for both our recognton and our ad. 39 We mght explore ths pont further by reference to another example. Suppose that a stray cat, a domestc cat and a human are all afflcted wth serous njures that are causng them to suffer pan. The pan s of sufficent severty to prevent them from pursung any sgnficant range of normal behavours. (We mght call to mnd, wth Levnas, the "moan," "cry" or "groan" that alerts us to the sufferng of another beng: 40 or, n the case of the cats, the plantve and persstent mewng that beseeches attenton and assstance from anyone who chances to hear t.)
Further suppose there are three optons open to someone who encounters one of these creatures and becomes aware of ts sufferng. The first opton s smply to allow the sufferng to contnue. The second opton s to end the sufferng by admnsterng a drug that wll cause swft and panless death. The thrd opton s to first admnster pan-relevng medcaton, and then undertake a medcal procedure so that the creature can recover to a pont where treatment s no longer necessary.
Let us first consder the stray cat. The gaze of the cat presents a prmal, nescapable demand for recognton as a beng capable of conscous experences; we are compelled to acknowledge ts sufferng. Most mmedately, as Levnas observes, the demand presented by the vctm of sufferng s "a demand for analgesa, more pressng, more urgent … than a demand for consolaton or the postponement of death." 41 As a consequence, we are motvated to reject the first opton and respond to ts pan.
In the case of the domestc cat, the stuaton takes on an added level of complexty. Suppose we have just notced that the cat, whom we thought at first to be a stray, appears healthy and well-groomed. We become aware, not only of the gaze of the anmal, but also of the ethcal presence of ts human carers. In Levnasan terms, we find reflected n the eyes of the anmal the faces of those who care for t. 42 We are more lkely, therefore, to consder the thrd opton than n the case of the stray examned above, nsofar as good conscence motvates us to acknowledge the cat's carers.
The case of the human, on the other hand, weghs upon us stll more deeply. The gaze of the human oblges us to recognse her radcal alterty, as someone possessng plans, ntentons, desres and nterests that are rreducble to our own. More than ths: t fascnates and revolts us, drawng us nto an ethcal bond from whch there s no clear prospect of relef. The human s a stranger n an unmstakably deeper sense than other anmals. We can grasp, albet ncompletely, the sufferng of a cat, by seekng external causes for the dscomfort. The human, however, s nfintely more complex; she holds preferences and atttudes that slp radcally beyond our grasp.
The gaze of the human sgnfies a contngent, shftng field of outlooks, commtments and responses. It beseeches us to respect the path she envsages for herself. It s for ths reason we are strongly drawn to the thrd opton. The mmedate demand s for analgesa, but ths, as Levnas notes, sgnals the openng of "the anthropologcal category of the medcal," 43 wth ts technologcally coded promse of a future to come. As wth the prevous case, we also sense n the gaze of the human the presence of those who care for her, addng an addtonal level to our ethcal engagement.
VII. ThE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EThICS
The precedng sectons of ths artcle have explored the nature of the ethcal encounter wth the non-human Other n lght of Levnas' theory. I have suggested that non-human anmals present rreducble clams for recognton as ethcal bengs, although these clams have a dfferent character to those presented by humans. In order to move from ths account of ethcal experence to a theory of anmal rghts, t s necessary to explore Levnas' vews on the relatonshp between the prmordal nature of ethcal experence and the conceptual structures of moralty and poltcs.
Levnas emphasses the particularity of the ethcal encounter. The face-to-face encounter may be descrbed as partcular n two dstnct but ntertwned senses. Frst, the experence of the encounter s prmordal and, therefore, ressts expresson through general terms and concepts; and, second, the encounter generates a unque and nescapable responsblty that rests on the subject alone. These features of the ethcal encounter seem to cast doubt upon the possblty of genunely shared judgements about ethcal sgnficance. It s hard to see how the experence could be ether genunely shared by multple subjects or accurately communcated between them.
Levnas' comments on ths ssue are elusve. However, he hnts at a resoluton n Totality and Infinity when he speaks about tme as the deepenng of ethcs. Through repeated nteractons wth the Other, Levnas notes, "the alterty of each face ncreases and deepens ever more profoundly." The dscrete encounters that make up ethcal experence "do not lnk up wth one another ndfferently, but extend from the Other unto me."
44 Each encounter wth the Other nvolves an epphany; over tme, however, our repeated ethcal encounters lnk together to form an overall concepton of socal lfe. We come to regard ourselves as orented towards the socal envronment, assumng responsblty for the Other wherever we find her. In ths way, the alterty of the face does not lessen wth each encounter, but rather "ncreases and deepens" as each nteracton resonates wth prevous experences.
The above analyss enables us to understand how ethcal dscourse s possble. Social judgements about ethical significance arse from the concdence of multple ethcal experences synthessed by ndvdual actors. 45 They are socal habts that carry wth them the weght of repeated ethcal encounters. It s these socal judgements, whch arse passvely from the contnuous sequence of socal lfe, that form the bass for our reflectve engagement wth ethcal questons. More than ths: t s these socal judgements that render such questons dstnctvely ethical, snce they mark out ethcally sgnficant fields of acton from other stes of practcal reasonng.
At ths pont, Levnas' account of ethcs rases a further ssue. What s the relatonshp between our socal judgements of ethcal sgnficance and the reflectve process of moral reasonng? In order to engage n moral delberaton, we must translate the passve synthess of ethcal experence to a ratonal framework of prncples and rules. However, the dynamc character of socal judgement mltates aganst such a reductve enterprse.
Levnas acknowledges ths tenson n Otherwise than Being by drawng an mportant dstncton between the sayng [le dire] and the sad [le dit]. The sayng s revealed through my nteracton wth the Other. It ressts phrasng and therefore comes to my awareness only through the way t speaks to me n the ethcal moment. The sad, by contrast, comprses statements or propostons to whch truth values may be assgned. As Crtchley puts t, the sad s "the content of my words," whereas the sayng "conssts n the fact that these words are beng addressed to an nterlocutor." 46 The sad thematses and conceptualses, whle the sayng ressts categorsaton. It s temptng to conclude that the sayng and the sad are entrely alen to one another. However, Levnas ressts ths outcome. Although my responsblty for the Other s "pror to anythng sad," t s both necessary and possble that the sayng be "thematsed, that s, manfest tself, that t enter nto a proposton and a book." 47 The sayng must find expresson n propostonal form n order to support the possblty of justce, poltcs and law. 48 Why are justce and law necessary? For Levnas, the answer les n the phenomenon of the third party. The thrd party s the neghbour of my neghbour, who s one step removed from me n terms of the face-to-face; she s all those, other than the Other, who may be affected n some way by my response to the ethcal encounter. The presence of the thrd party challenges me to unversalse my relatonshp wth the Other. It necesstates "assemblng, order, thematsaton ... the ntellgblty of a system" 49 -n a word, justce. If the subject and the Other were alone n the world, the problem of justce would not arse. The thrd party, however, "nterrupts" the proxmty of the face-to-face.
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VIII. MORAL BELONgINg
The appearance of the thrd party, by makng t both necessary and possble for the subject to thematse her responsbltes to other people, sgnals a new queston concernng moral belonging. Although I can never entrely evade the gaze of the Other, the presence of the thrd party makes t possble to avert the force of the ethcal moment by shftng the experence onto the level of the sad. It becomes possble to post dstance between ourselves and those on the edges of our ethcal awareness. In such cases, the boundary between the sayng and the sad becomes blurred. It becomes possble to ask, "who s my neghbour?" I am able to decide whether or not to assume responsblty.
The appearance of the thrd party n the mdst of the ethcal encounter therefore sgnals an mportant queston. Why should I choose to acknowledge the demands of other people at the limits of my sensibility? Levnas hnts at a possble response n hs comments about conscence. 51 Accordng to Levnas, "conscence welcomes the Other," acceptng her nto the ethcal fold. My conscence does not overrde my freedom, but sts alongsde t, makng my spontanety appear "arbtrary and volent" where t runs up aganst questons concernng justce.
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On ths vew, then, moral delberaton conssts n reflective, good faith engagement wth prmordal socal judgements of ethcal sgnficance.
The ssue of moral belongng casts nto sharp relef the potental tenson between the demands of good conscence and good fath, on the one hand, and the human capacty for free moral choce, on the other. It s a matter of decdng who counts and why. Hstorcal examples llustratng the serousness of ths ssue are not hard to find. At varous tmes, women, slaves and members of partcular racal and cultural groups have been determned not to count for moral purposes. Blacks dd not count n nneteenth century Amerca; Jews dd not count n Naz Germany. Pervasve dscourses of cultural ratonalsaton pushed them to the outer margns of ethcs. It became all too easy not to count them.
Moral belongng, whch arses n the context of moral delberaton, should be contrasted wth what I would lke to call ethical personality, whch arses at the level of the sayng. Ethcal personalty arses wth our prmordal apprehenson of the demands for recognton presented by other people. We mght say that the ethcal demand s a demand for acknowledgement qua ethical personality. The content of the dea of ethcal personalty s neffable, snce t s wholly conveyed n the ethcal demand. At the margns of ethcal sensblty, however, due to the presence of the thrd party, ethcal personalty becomes embroled n the poltcal, gvng rse to the queston of moral belongng.
We mght usefully return at ths pont to Levnas' essay on "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rghts." There, Levnas descrbes how the gazes of "the other men, called free," who dealt wth the nternees, "strpped us of our human skn."
53 "A small nner murmur, the strength and wretchedness of persecuted people, remnded us of our essence as thnkng creatures, but we were no longer part of the world." Such "socal aggresson," for Levnas, "shuts people away n a class, deprves them of expresson and condemns them to beng 'sgnfiers wthout a sgnfied'." 54 In other words, the ethcal personalty of the persecuted ndvdual falls vctm to ratonalsaton and s repressed at the moral level.
In the stuaton descrbed by Levnas, the cultural ratonalsaton that excluded hm from moral belongng was perpetuated n Naz dogma. Jews, t was sad, were "subhuman;" for the greater good of the German people, they had to be repressed and extermnated. In ths way, the Jewsh neghbour s supplanted by the unversal Jew; she s replaced by a pure analytcal category. Insttutonally excluded from moral consderaton, members of such groups are pushed to the margns of socal conscousness, perpetually stuated as the thrd party.
We have seen n the precedng sectons that non-human creatures present a prmordal demand for acknowledgement as bengs capable of havng conscous experences; n partcular, our encounter wth such a creature places on us a responsblty to recognse and respond to ts sufferng. Many common commercal meat-producton practces would seem to clearly run counter to ths basc ethcal demand. How, then, can we explan the persstence of such technques? The answer s twofold.
Frst, few humans encounter the affected creatures on a regular bass apart from those nsttutonally engaged n ther explotaton. As such, the non-humans n queston occupy the poston of the thrd party n relaton to most ethcal agents; the problem of dstance arses. Second, there s a form of cultural ratonalsaton at work n relaton to the supposed need for meat and other anmal goods for human sustenance. 55 Ths dscourse explots the lack of proxmty between the subject and the non-human; t bears notng that people frequently react wth revulson when confronted drectly wth meat-producton practces and would be horrfied to see such treatment drected at domestc anmals.
Levnas comments n "Useless Sufferng" that "the justficaton of the neghbour's pan s certanly the source of all mmoralty." 56 There are two mportant deas n ths statement. Levnas' remark emphasses the fundamental place of sufferng n ethcs, but t equally takes am at the role of the sad n coverng over our ethcal responsbltes. The dea of justfyng my neghbour's sufferng, accordng to Levnas, s an "outrage." 57 In ths sense, ethcal responsblty entals guardng aganst the temptaton to ratonalse our actons, rather than engagng n good fath wth the ethcal demands of other bengs. Ths s the challenge posed by the noton of moral belongng. 
Ix. ANIMAL RIghTS
I return, then, to my ntal queston: what can we say, n good fath, about the moral status of anmals? By way of a concluson to ths artcle, I wsh to suggest t s both possble and constructve to thematse the clam to recognton presented by non-human anmals n the language of rghts. Levnas' work ssues a sustaned warnng aganst totalsng forms of moral dscourse, whch threaten to submerge the partcularty of the ethcal encounter. However, Levnas does not portray moral questons as radcally ndetermnate; rather, he presents a nuanced account of the nterplay between the sayng and the sad, emphassng ther necessary role n supportng the moral communty.
Levnas cautons us not to over-smplfy the necessarly ambguous relatonshp between pre-reflectve ethcal experence and the conceptual framework mposed n moral delberaton. It s not that moral concepts are somehow embedded n the experental features of ethcal lfe. Rather, they are layered onto the ethcal context, medated by the requrement of good conscence. In order to respond n good fath to the appearance of the thrd party n the face-to-face encounter, t s necessary to formulate a conceptual framework for pursung justce that acknowledges ethcal personalty. Ths wll nevtably nvolve recourse to concepts such as rghts, dutes, nterests and so forth, but these deas should be vewed as subsdary to the pre-reflectve ethcal envronment. 58 We have seen that non-human anmals present a prmordal clam for recognton as sentent bengs; the capacty for sufferng, n partcular, features largely n the ethcal field generated by such encounters. Ths s a clam for respect qua ethcal personalty; t demands a partcular mode of treatment. It seems natural to conceptualse ths ethcal relatonshp n terms of rghts and dutes. Dutes, n ths context, supply ther bearers wth other-regarding reasons for acton; they are reasons I have because of what I owe to somebody else. We mght justly speak of a moral duty to recognse and respond to the sufferng of non-human anmals; the correlatve of ths duty s a moral rght.
It s mportant to be clear what s meant here by the noton of correlativity. The very dea of correlatvty between rghts and dutes may seem problematc from a Levnasan perspectve: ndeed, as we have seen, Levnas strongly ressts a symmetrcal vew of the ethcal encounter. However, the noton of correlatvty, as I use t here, does not mply ethcal equvalence. There s a logical correlatvty between rghts and dutes (at least where these notons are understood as other-regarding); analytcally speakng, each s the analogue of the other. If I have a duty in respect of another person, that person holds a rght n respect of me. If somebody else has a duty to me, I become, ipso facto, the bearer of a rght.
However, behnd ths logcal relaton, whch arses purely at the level of the sad, les the ultmate ground of normatve dscourse: the ethical prorty of the subject's responsblty for the Other. It s my prmeval duty to acknowledge the ethcal personalty of other sentent bengs that gves rse to rghts dscourse. The openng of rghts dscourse rases the prospect that I, too, may have rghts. However, t s only through reference to the rghts of the Other that I can recognse myself as potentally a rghts-bearng entty: the type of thing, thematcally speakng, to whch rghts mght belong.
It follows that rghts are always, n the first place, the rghts of the Other: the formal correlatvty of rghts and dutes s only possble nsofar as I acknowledge myself as subject to an uncondtonal ethcal demand. I, too, may bear rghts; but my rghts appear "arbtrary and volent" where they run up aganst my dutes to other people. 59 The challenge of rghts dscourse, therefore, s to prevent the prmordal clams of the Other from beng submerged n the logcal framework of rghts and dutes. As Levnas says, "the prncpal task … conssts n thnkng the Other-n-the-Same wthout thnkng the Other as another Same." 60 The above analyss suggests that there are rsks -as well as benefits -n ascrbng rghts to humans. Rghts dscourse provdes a rch and versatle conceptual framework for recognsng the socal dmenson of ethcal personalty. On the other hand, the avalablty of ratonalsaton as a technque of moral avodance means that people may nvoke the language of rghts n order to evade ther ethcal responsbltes. Rghts dscourse may be used to acknowledge the Other; t may also be used to place the Other at a dstance. People may assert the rghts accorded to them as Other, precsely n order to keep the Other at bay.
As Levnas makes clear, the ethcal encounter s essentally asymmetrcal: t starts from oneself and projects outwards towards the Other. The strangeness of the Other prevents me from assumng a recprocalty of oblgatons. It s only where the Other reveals herself by assumng responsblty for aspects of our common world that a form of recprocalty s created. 61 Moral dscourse ntroduces a form of symmetry that s unthnkable n the ethcal encounter. In ths sense, t represents a potental barrer, as well as a necessary ad, to good fath engagement wth ethcal experence.
That s the problem of rghts dscourse as t apples between humans. It s a problem of whch Levnas s keenly aware. The problem arses because ndvdual humans play a double role n moral dscourse: both Self and Other, hostage and captor, potental holder of rghts and dutes. Does the same problem arse when we ascrbe rghts to non-human anmals? The answer must depend upon whether non-humans, lke humans, may approprate ther putatve rghts as an ad to moral avodance.
It s sometmes argued that, snce non-humans are ncapable of engagng n moral dscourse and delberaton, they should not be regarded as holdng moral rghts. 62 It s true that non-humans do not seem to qualfy as moral agents, n any meanngful sense of the term. In the first place, t s questonable whether non-human creatures make anythng akn to socal judgements of ethcal sgnficance. Wthout such judgements, there can be no value, at least n the ethcal sense examned here. Furthermore, the vast majorty of non-humans appear to 59 lack anythng approachng the human capacty for moral reflecton. They therefore do not partake n the ontologcal separaton of value and wll that s central to human ethcal experence and, accordngly, are not responsible for ther engagement wth any context of value that may appear to them. However, the fact that non-humans cannot be charactersed as moral agents does not mean they lack moral rghts; t only means that they are not susceptble to moral duties. If non-human anmals are not moral agents, they have no moral responsbltes; as such, they cannot engage n moral avodance. At the same tme, however, such creatures may stll make ethcal demands upon other bengs wth a greater capacty for moral choce. There s no contradcton n holdng that a beng may present ethcal clams to others whle not beng susceptble to or answerable for such entreates tself.
Non-human anmals gaze at us from beyond the borders of the moral communty, commandng but not commanded. There s no rsk here of entrenchng rghts as a mode of moral avodance: non-humans cannot explot ther rghts to keep the Other at a dstance, nor can we straghtforwardly assert our own putatve rghts as a way of evadng ther clams aganst us. It follows that t s relatvely unproblematc to acknowledge such creatures as bearers of rghts. Indeed, from ths perspectve, the rghts of non-human anmals mght properly be regarded as a model for human rghts: what Levnas descrbes as the rghts of a "stranger," 63 granted purely out of respect for ethcal personalty, wthout expectng or demandng anythng n return.
